

JS

OR

HOW TO PLEASE KHRUSHCHEV AND HATE INTELLIGENCE*

The books reviewed in this journal usually are serious analyses of international affairs and not sensation-mongering books of the "confidential" type. The present book falls into the latter category. It is given space neither for its quality nor its "message" but in order to expose this ill-begotten concoction of unconnected facts, inconsistencies, insinuations and suggestive political pornography for what it really is, at least in my view: a dent in our national security and a comfort to our enemies wherever they are.

The authors allegedly are concerned that the American people have not been told all there is to tell about U. S. intelligence. "The book is an attempt" they thunder, self-righteously, "within bounds of national security, to reveal the nature, size and power of the invisible government," and "to describe a hidden American institution which the American people, who finance it, have a right to know about." The authors, young men in their mid-thirties, have yet to learn the meaning of national security. They do not seem to know it, for they have done their level best to piece together all the information they could obtain, from overt and not so overt sources, to present to the world as clear as possible a picture of U. S. clandestine operations. They have not altogether

* David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government, Random House, New York, 1964.

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succeeded but they have found enough small pieces to create a mosaic which will be welcomed joyfully in Moscow and Peking.

The authors sanctimoniously pretend to defend "the peoples right to know." There is no government in this harsh world which can afford to make the public privy to all it does in the area of international affairs. Woodrow Wilson's illusion of "open covenants openly arrived at" belongs to the never-never land of political fairy tales. As individuals, so governments must have the right to conceal if they wish to cope efficiently with their environment. There must be a limit to their confessions to the citizenry. The decisive factor is not the right to know but the need to know. If the people - and the authors - do not like this, insisting on "the consent of the governed," they must go to the polls which is the democratic way of doing things. Once they have elected a government, that government is the only one they have and there is no choice but to trust it. If they still do not like it, they must elect another one next time. If they do not want to wait four years, they might try to replace the American presidential system with the British parliamentary one so that they can throw out their elected representatives even before their tenure is up.

What is this fabled "invisible government"? It is a catchy but phoney slogan for the United States intelligence services in general and the Central Intelligence Agency in particular. It is, in the words of the authors, "a loose amorphous grouping of individuals and agencies drawn from many parts of the visible government." Presumably the authors

are afflicted with astigmatism because I, and I am sure most other political observers, can clearly see what the authors call invisible. The men and organizations they mention are all prominent officials who can be detected with the naked eye. They are drawn from the White House staff, the National Security Council and what is called the intelligence community, which consists of the CIA, the State Department, the Armed Forces, the Atomic Energy Commission and the FBI.

The CIA is the roof organization for American intelligence which, prior to World War II, was practically non-existent. The members of the so-called "Special Group" to which the authors seem to attribute sinister designs, are as much in the public eye as any government leaders. There is nothing malign in creating compact groups of executives charged with certain responsibilities for carrying out specific policy decisions. A government too inflexible to create such organizational auxiliaries does not do its job.

We know now, ^{by the authors' own admission,} that none of the major policy decisions on operations such as Cuba, Guatemala, Iran, etc. were made by either the Special Group or the intelligence community. In every case the U. S. government, in the person of the President and in one case with the concurrence of the British Government, has given its consent to proposals which the groups in charge had to implement. We know that the counsel for such action comes from coordinated and interested government departments such as State, Defense and the CIA. If the authors complain that these men keep their collective mouths shut and do not broadcast their intentions around the world, they are correct.

Secrecy is not invisibility. The effectiveness of intelligence operations depends on secrecy. It is impossible to carry out successful intelligence operations and at the same time take everybody and his brother into confidence. This is an infantile illusion.

I do not pretend, as the authors do, to know all about the intelligence operations of their "invisible government." It is quite possible that some of their revelations are true, but that does not absolve them from the guilt of having publicized them. Nor does the way in which they present their views absolve them from bias and innuendo directed against the intelligence agencies in general and the CIA in particular. In some cases such as that of Indonesia they go rather far in demanding that their readers swallow non-sequiturs. For example, they seem to assume that the "soldier of fortune, Allen Pope," by the simple fact of his capture, set in motion (a) the release of 37,000 tons of rice to be shipped to Indonesia, (b) the lifting of an arms embargo and (c) a conference between John Foster Dulles and the Indonesian ambassador. Does this sound reasonable? Not to me. In the cases of Laos and Vietnam they simplify extremely complex situations to the level of fifteen year olds. To try to present a picture in which the CIA "dictates" policy in these two Southeast Asian countries when the U. S. government in its entirety is concerned with their problems is utterly absurd. The Guatemala story makes good spy thriller reading but even if it were the truth, (the authors actually quote discussions between Samozza and Ydigoras as if they had been present and taken notes) it misses the

point the authors are after, namely, to smear the intelligence community. Again, in a chapter describing the alleged "Kennedy shake-up," they quote Messrs. Nixon and Udall, Eisenhower and Salinger verbatim; perhaps the authors of the "invisible government" discovered the secret of making themselves invisible and attended these discussions with an invisible tape recorder.

Their venom is particularly noticeable in the chapter called "The Secret Elite" when they implicitly profess their dislike for John McCone. In mentioning congressional opposition to his appointment as Director of Central Intelligence, they make sure that voice is given to those who disapproved, not the majority which approved. (It is in this chapter that they call the FBI a part of the "invisible government"!)

The desire of the authors to smear CIA is particularly blatant in the chapter "A Grey Operation" which purports to describe the exchange deal of Cuban prisoners for medical supplies. The authors go to a great deal of trouble to drag the CIA into this one too, although there is little or no evidence that it actually was involved. Innuendo is a powerful weapon as we all sadly remember from the McCarthy era; the authors know well how to use it.

As an academician, I am revolted by the attempt on the part of the authors to alienate the academic community from the U. S. government, just when this government has at last reached the inevitable conclusion that it needs the cooperation of knowledgeable and specialized professors to do research in the social and political sciences which by the nature of Civil

Service requirements cannot properly be done in government offices. This is not a question of "hidden money" since the "invisible government" exists only in the minds of the authors. My own feeling, and that of many of my colleagues, is that if the government requires a research job it becomes the duty of academicians as Americans to do it. I took this for granted; apparently the authors do not. The MIT Center for International Studies has never denied that it did research work for the CIA; why should it? The publications of this Center are sufficient proof that it is well equipped to do excellent work especially in the field of communist affairs. Why single out MIT? There are many other universities that have undertaken studies for the government, "invisible" or visible, and they are none the worse for it. Their faculties have enriched their horizons and the government has had the benefit of their views.

Since the authors are afraid the intelligence community might eliminate American freedoms - presumably because its members keep mum as they ought - they discuss the issue of controls. They do this from the point of view of Senator Fulbright which is not shared by the majority of the Senate or any of the past three Presidents. The issue has come up from time to time, but the Senate has rejected overwhelmingly the proposal to create a Joint Intelligence Committee (after the model of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee) and the Presidents would almost certainly have vetoed any such resolution. The authors shrug off the existing congressional committees simply

because they do not like the "conservatism" of "the men in charge." They brush aside President Eisenhower's board of consultants on foreign intelligence activities of 1956 and President Kennedy's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board of 1961. What else could be done to "control" the CIA? Yet another committee? I do not see the point; I see only the innuendo. Control is exercised by the President and his delegates, special or otherwise, a congressional committee and a committee of distinguished citizens; this, I believe, is sufficient.

The authors take their "exhibits" where they can get them. They refer to former President Truman's recent negative statement on intelligence operations. They do not recall, however, that it was Mr. Truman who signed the National Security Act of 1947 into law, well realizing what it meant when the law states that the CIA was to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." This clearly authorized operational activities without which no intelligence organization worth its keep can function. The NSC or other responsible groups, so far as is known, never objected to these activities. Nor did Mr. Truman's successors. This is as it should be for those responsible for our security are not guardians of morality but of national survival. Besides, intelligence consists of analysis and operations; one cannot do without the other. Perhaps Mr. Truman's memory of these facts has dimmed somewhat but I respectfully suggest that his recent complaint is not equal to his presidential actions.

And so it goes, on and on. Unconnected issues, thrown together like a tossed salad, dressed with sensationalism and insinuations. Why? Why should the authors write and an American publisher pay for the printing of this oversized pamphlet? Is it supposed to improve our government? Is it to "liberate" us from the shackles of CIA "serfdom"? Is it to accuse the U. S. Government of irresponsible actions?

I question the motivation of the authors. The least that can be said about their book is that it lacks understanding of the intelligence process; they attribute sinister motives to our intelligence efforts and they want dirty operational linen (it cannot help being dirty; the cold war is dirty too) washed in public; they are ready to condemn but withhold praise where praise is due. The worst that can be said about the book is that it was written to make money regardless of the consequences to our national security. Perhaps the answer lies somewhere in between but of one thing I am sure: This book is not in the best interests of the United States.

P. S. I have just received the Soviet publication INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, no. 6 of June, 1964. Among the articles of this Moscovite journal I found one of particular interest: "CIA Intrigues in Latin America" by V. Valentinov. I was struck by the similarity of substance and approach in this article and the book by Ross and Wise. The dislike of our intelligence work displayed by the authors of "The Invisible Government" is heartily shared by the Soviets.

Kurt L. London